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Independent
Paths or Shared Ways?
Csaba Varga
Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States,
one of the classics of the formative years of American legal
realism, defined his programmatic stand almost one hundred
and twenty years ago as follows: legal notions have to be
washed with “cynical acid” so that they can serve as genuinely
legal concepts, stripped of theological and moral (etc.) overtones. Because, as he devised,
“Moral predilections
must not be allowed to influence our minds in settling legal
distinctions”.
Thus the question
arises: is someone calling for cynicism inevitably cynical
himself?
We know that such approach was called
functionalism at the time. It held as a basic tenet
that each and every component of the social complex has to
serve with full strength at its own place, as it is just its
specific particularity as distinguished from anything else
that may have motivated its coming into an own existence.
It is the ideal of functionalism in law, for the institutionalisation
of which modern formal
law has once been invented and developed. Historically,
this was exactly the product of European bureaucratism (gaining
strength from the early 19th century) that began
to assimilate the state structure to its organisatory needs
with an earlier unheard-of efficiency. As to its first step,
law was thoroughly formalised to develop its particular homogeneity.
In return,
·
law became autonomous
·
with
distinguished particularity
·
to
function in a specific
way. This necessitated own responsibility in overall co-operation,
with interactions in any direction regarding any complex.
Thereby functionalism is also expressive of an
instrumental tendency, in theoretical conclusion of
the fact that, from now on, modern social existence can only
be explained as the self-realisation of straightly co-operating
partial totalities, relatively separated yet thoroughly connected
on the plane of the whole totality. This is what George
Lukács and his
circle once described as the domination of homogeneous autonomies
developed on the terrain of undivided heterogeneity emerging
in everyday existence, in which each and every complex (separating
out from the total complex by advancing its particularities)
becomes both specified and, operating according to own criteria
as one given homogeneity, relatively independent from the total complex (undertaking
the risk of confrontation as well). On the field of macro-sociological theory-building,
Niklas Luhmann, too, arrived at a similar conclusion one decade
later, having formulated the category of Ausdifferenzierung as a theoretical foundation stone, to
indicate separation and isolation, in the course of which
the specific operation of law would appear with a binary code,
responding by the exclusive alternative of either ‘lawful’
or ‘unlawful’.
All this anticipated the chance of dysfunctionality in actual
operation, running against the values originally designed
to be implemented. For long as known, scholarship has considered
such occurrences to be just mistakes, marginal in practice. At the same time, however, theoretical description
has defined the ontological result by some
mutuality in operation, forming a
“tendential unity”, which at any time will determine
the total whole. This is expressed among others by the fact
that for Lukács
in his social ontology, language and law are from the outset
distinguished from the rest of social being (taken as the
total operation of the total complex consisting of partial
complexes). Or, language and law are held to be mere intermediators
that do not operate with own values, for they exclusively
mediate among values taken from other (non-mediatory) complexes.
By the help of instrumental values they may generate as wedged
in the process, they are to enhance the efficiency of their
mediatory roles at the most. Of course, inspired by historical
materialism rooted in economic determinism, Lukács presumed a component able to play an overdominant role
in the total process hic et nunc. But having arrived
at social ontologising from Bolshevik revolutionism, the aged
Lukács had already to realise that hegemonic determination
by any complex becoming totally dominant (in the shadow of
which no further partial complex could any longer play the
proper role to be played) would inevitably harm and distort
the whole totality.
Let us raise the question: what practices may arise in our
day from such and similar recognitions? If we consider only
the alternatives of medical law, i.e., of making malpractice
a subject of civil action, one of the three solutions as follows
may emerge in principle:
·
no
responsibility and no justiciability in practice (as once
practised in the “actually existing system of socialism” in
Hungary and the entire region);
·
responsibility made almost absolute (as evolved in result
of the self-assertion of lawyers in the United States of America);
·
personal or institutional responsibility enforceable via the
specific medium of the medical profession (idealised as a
perspective for Hungary after the fall of Communism).
Well, assessing
the field by such extreme poles (with some sensitivity to
our domestic traditions) within such a threefold perspective of past,
present and possible future, we can take the following consequences
into account in the light of today’s procedures and of our
prospects getting further Americanised:
(1) the assumption
of responsibility enforced by lawsuits will be built back
as auxiliary cost into the expenses of health care, which
has to result in the overall rise of its budgeting;
(2) the actual
accrual of health cost is taken out from the proper field
of health care, only to be divided among suing clients and
the lawyerly caste; in response to which
(3) on part of
both the health supplier and the client, further juridifying
mechanisms (mediations and formalisations) will be subsequently
wedged in the hitherto purely health-centred processes, mechanisms
that are alien to the original ethos and inherent rationality
of health care and which may shake its very foundations with
a parasitical intrusion. With legal safety becoming a consideration
in focus, a new practice (eliminating procedures and risky
choices once generously accepted in practice) may come about.
Finally, all this
(4) further professionalises
the practices of the medical profession, cutting up traditional
treatment processes into artificially isolated partial processes.
That is, the medical profession will try to reduce both frustration
and predictable damages by deploying additional (cost-increasing)
staff with professional “mind-healing” (psychological) specialisation
in the process (as the paradoxical after-effect of sheer artificiality
and exaggerated bureaucratisation, arising from the depersonalisation
of the entire procedure, in fact worsening the patient’s healing
prospects)—needless to say, to no use.
On the final analysis,
all this will not in the slightest degree increase the actual
(and morally reasonable) responsibility to be borne by social
healthcare for its action achievable within the given society’s
tolerance and funding limits.
This is probably the most costly outcome both financially
and also regarding its erosive effect on medical ethos, which
is to result from an external control of health care, alien
to it and unduly overcoming it, driven solely by lawyerly
arrivism and profiteering as guided by professional imperialism.
Yet, at the same time this proves to be also the least effective
solution. All that notwithstanding, it still seems to step
by step subdue the entire medical organisation, whereas the
course to take it has by far not been necessary. One and a
half decades ago, back at the beginnings of our transition
from communism, its feasibility and acceptability was still
an open issue in Hungary, at a time when the external pressure
by a professional push—accompanied by an internal agitation
to introduce and tolerate an American-type lawyerly rule—first
became perceptible in the country.
Considering all this now both as a danger and warning—when research is so much exhaustive as to devote
attention to cultural anthropological investigations of tribal
communities of a few hundred members surviving sporadically—, we might at last take notice of the fact that
the Atlantic civilisation, so clearly determining our near
future, has been composed over the past centuries of two definitely
diverging ethoses and social philosophical inspirations, differing
also by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps
most conspicuous today as to be seen in the difference between
approaches to life as a
struggle and to
law as a game within it. No doubt, on the one hand,
there prevails
·
a European Christian tradition,
characterised by communal ethos, with provision of rights
as counter-balanced by obligations, in which priority is given
to the peace of society, and a traditional culture of virtues
is promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge human
rights with a focus on prevention and remedy of harms. It
is such an environment within which homo ludens as
a type of the playful human who is both dutiful and carefree,
i.e., entirely joyful, constitutes a limiting value. If and in so far as struggle appears at all on
the scene, it is mostly recognised as a
fight for excellence. As a pathologic version, the
loneliness of those staying away from participation may lead
to psychical disorders which require subconscious re-compensation,
the symbolic sanctioning of which (typically in the stale
and excited Vienna of the turn of 19th and 20th
centuries and by a psychologist of middle-class women shut
into self-consuming idleness) was accomplished by Sigmund
Freud. On the other hand, there has also evolved
·
an
Americanised individualistic atomisation of society,
expecting order out of chaos, with absolutisation of rights
ascribed to individuals, all closed back in loneliness. As
an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements,
and unrestrained struggle becomes a normal course of life
with the deployment of human rights to neutralise and disintegrate
community-centred standards. ‘Life is struggle’—the hero of
our brave new world enunciates it as a commonplace with teeth
clenched, convinced that life is barely anything but fight against anybody else (as an improved version, hailed—under the
pretext of maximising the chances—as civilisatory advancement
by re-actualising the ominous bellum omnium contra omnes,
formulated by Hobbes
in early modern England). Following such examples, feminist
self-reliance may stand for a contemporary pathological ideal
type, struggling herself back into unhappy loneliness by engaging
in fight with her jaw and targetedly developed further abilities.
It is mostly
such and similar stimuli that nourish our uneasy experience
in our globalised present, with ideals of order, standards
and cultural patterns that transform status struggles (based
on gender, colour, etc.) into in-law struggles, and which,
under the aegis of law, support disproportionate financial
indemnification for alleged psychological injuries so as to
gain material fortune, and which thereby replace collective
solidarity by individual arrivism and disintegrate cohesive
forces by societal atomisation.
Is it really such an outcome what we have wanted in our nation
building through centuries? Is it really this what is worth
wanting now when we are freed to shape our fate, given the
chance to change the past regime?
In want of other points of reference in our spiritually emptying
world (almost lacking unconditional respect for, and followance
of, values), let me recall a few lessons taught by historical
legal anthropology and the history of legal philosophy, referring uniformly to the significance of the
moment of trust in the mechanisms of feedback and the necessity
of complexity in social existence. Well, both in early Jewish,
Islamic (etc.) traditions and even nowadays in surviving autochthonous
cultures (lacking in resources, therefore stipulating maximum
efficiency as the condition of survival), we can observe the
compulsion by two sorts of axiomatism with clearly ideological
operation, which organise human choices into a framework unquestionably
ready-made from the outset. One of these perspectivical optima is
·
the
idea of proportionality
with self-moderation,
based on the priority of public good. This spread first
as shalom, or the precedence for public peace to protect
society, which, later in Roman development, was formulated
as the dilemma of formalism expressed by the adage
of summum ius, summa iniuria, to be recognised from the Middle Ages on as the
virtue of temperantia. The other is the
·
ideal
of natural law.
·
·
presumed human responsibility (in forms developed in East-Asia,
Latin America, as well as in the Christianity and Islam) for
our environment as inherited by us exclusively for use and
to be handed down to the following generations safely;
·
·
defined (in its Christianised Greek–Roman version) minimum
conditions (suitable to a formulation in sets of principles,
rules, and exceptions from rules) as a comprehensive framework
for social life in a symbolic expression of the created (or,
profanely, the somehow organised) order: first, representing
the whole cosmos, then, the humanly observable world, later
on, society, and finally, the individual (with responses echoed
by both theology and politics, ethology and cultural anthropology).
Eventually, in
our secularised age, this ideal was first replaced by
·
·
·
endowing the ideal of natural law, unchanged in principle
as transcendent to human existence, with changing (developing)
contents [Naturrecht mit wechselndem Inhalte] at the
end of the 19th century, then, by
·
·
·
its institutionalisation as “the nature of things themselves”
[Natur der Sache; nature des choses] by the
jurisprudence of continental countries with Latin or German
roots after World War II, in order to provide guidance for the desirable
harmony among functions in conflict, as derivable from the
pondering upon all circumstances of the issue in question.
Returning to foundations in the philosophy of science, the
first and primary task of human thinking is to delineate the
frameworks, boundaries and limits within which human action
may have a context, which prompted our ancestors to search
for the methodological ways of thought. In fact, from the
age of Descartes,
European civilisation reduced what may be at all thought of
to what can be deduced from some unquestionable truths through
logical (re)construction. This has led to a kind of naturalism,
reminiscent of naive realism on the pattern of the wisdom
of lex mentis est lex entis, presuming parallelism, moreover, correspondence,
between thought and reality. Conversely, in early times, even
the created nature of the world was conceived of in a geometrical
order according to mathematics’ ideal, inspired by the Biblical
exposition “But you have disposed all things by measure and
number and weight”. In result, human thought was also confined to
a mathesis universalis, posited as a sheer conceptual
arithmetics, within the presumption of an all-pervasive natural
and notional systemicity. By the Enlightenment’s combatant
materialism, first of all the modelling of cognition upon
the pattern of reflection was developed in depth, which kept
on surviving, among others, as the central epistemo-ontological
pre-supposition of Marxisms. Eventually, from all this, it is mostly the unconditional
hegemony of rationalisms that has remained by today. This is the dogma according to which only what
is rationally justifiable can become subject of theoretical
reconstruction—ignoring the brutal fact that, as the side-effect
of modern scientific revolution, this mind-set may only contribute
to the deprivation of man of a number of his further qualities;
for man, with his inborn facultases, is significantly
more and richer in emotional, intuitive, transcendent (etc.)
life than claimed by the idea reducing his complexity (when
assessing his self-positioning in the world) to one single,
exclusive quality.
This is the pattern which the very concept of ‘social science’
complies with: in its germ, a typically American leftist idea
(originating from the same source as
Marxism, namely, scientific positivism), according
to which a science on society can be built on a thoroughly
factual foundation with empirical methodology, enabling social
engineers to draw necessary conclusions from measuring given
states of attitudes (etc.) to predict future behaviours (etc.).
Well, such a “sterile morphology” (flourishing from the interwar
period up to the 1950s as marked by
Talcott Parsons’ ahistorically universalised analytical
system of concepts) has proved to be a dead end by today, re-admitting again the old ideal of the humanities,
which admits that when approaching the specifically human,
something more is at stake than a merely rational codifiability.
Obviously, even more is at stake when we encounter the claim
(rejuvenated after the failure of the one-time attempt to
axiomatise ethics) to negotiate moral and social psychological issues
on the pattern of classical analysis taken as conceptual mathematics,
absolutising a methodology according to which—of course, for
the sake and within the bounds of the given conceptual system—only
what can be rationally concluded and justified is thinkable
at all, forgetting that human reflection is by far more complex
than that.
Therefore, as against a mechanical world-concept symbolised
by the ancient clockwork’s metaphor, our existence is nonetheless a total whole all
through: a totality resulting from the constant competition
of interactions by practically unlimited sets of uninterrupted
processes, (re)generated in autopoiesis, which inseparably
closes (back) its ontological and epistemological determinations
and partial processes into its own total process. If we do
not raise the issue as a theologically founded question (or
if we reject, in the spirit of Occam’s
razor, the teleological moment to be raised from the outset),
then it remains an insoluble enigma whether or not that what
we think a limit in terms of values in such processes can
at the same time also be regarded as objective? Or, formulated
as a paradox, is ‘objectivity’ available at all when one insists
on “pure” scholarship?
Returning again to economy, we have to conclude that without
a vision of man with his entire complexity (including theological,
anthropological, ethical and psychological aspects as well),
not even economy can
be fully explained. Obviously, ethics is also necessary for
economy as a desideratum in order to mentally construct
and ontologically posit it. Otherwise speaking, economic rationality
is certainly at its proper place in forecalculation when we
consider probabilities or take it into account as one of the
criteria in managing conflicting situations, but it certainly
cannot be the exclusive motive to rely on in the operation
of the overall complex. Or, ethics is by far not just a merely
corrective, complementary factor in economy. It is of a foundational
significance to give it a framework so that the issue of economic
rationality itself can be raised at all.
As we have already remarked, in legal regulation, the concept
of a system (formulated by, e.g., Grotius
at the dawn of modern age), built up exhaustively and gaplessly
in (natural) law and formed according to the ideal of mos
geometricus, as broken down to individual positivations
according to logical necessity, was later on replaced by the
mere definition of basic principles and (somewhat as an added
exemplification) their arrangement in rules and exceptions
from rules, so that the various situations in life can be
judged according to principles in a pattern-like but individualised
way, bearing their total complexity in mind. Likewise in economy,
morality serves as an ethos defining a general direction,
while in individual situations it helps in balancing conflicts
of values, in mediation of interests and mutual pondering,
which may finally lead to compromise solutions. Consequently,
in economy,
·
at
the level of macro-processes, moral is an ontic component
to serve as a foundation that makes economic rationality reasonable
and also socially interpretable; while
·
in
micro-processes, it has also to be taken cognisance of in
the background, aware of the fact that it gets almost never
recoursed to directly and one-sidedly but through reconciliatory
processes, in order to solve conflicts and reach compromises
by balancing, mediating and mutual pondering.
It is exactly such a duality that opens up to both further
requirements and additional wide- ranging prospects that may
come in useful in our procedures at any time, for
·
·
in macro-relations (e.g., in patterns proposed by medical
law), it is exactly an ethical consideration that may generate
correlating alternative models which we can endow, through
strategic planning and a series of tactical decisions, with
a definite patterning function, standardised as comprehensive
social policies, after their harmonisation with prevailing
economic and legal policies is done; while
·
·
in micro-relations, we have to provide for the model-like
operation of this through education, socialisation and case
analysis, caring for the diversity and particularity of individual
situations with proper empathy, taking into account also our
ultimate goals and assisting such an operation with the store
of instruments suitable to both framing and practical feedback.
With this, we
have opted for the demand for human entirety, encouraged to
avail ourselves of the potentialities offered by specialisation
and homogenisation in our complex age with good conscience,
but at all times in a way not to miss the ultimate goal, the
intention—desirably guiding all our human actions—of implementing
fundamental values in practice.
In its first version, in Placet experiri Ünnepi
tanulmányok Bánrévy
Gábor 75. születésnapjára [Essays in honour of Gábor Bánrévy
on the occasion of his 75th birthday]
ed. Katalin Raffai (Budapest:
[Print Trade] 2004), pp. 338–348.
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