Are necessary and eternal things subject to the eternal law?

It seems that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law:

Objection 1:  Everything reasonable (rationabile) is subject to a plan (ratio).  But God’s will is reasonable, since it is just.  Therefore, it is subject to a plan.  But the eternal law is God’s plan.  Therefore, God’s will is subject to the eternal law.  But God’s will is something eternal.  Therefore, even eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

Objection 2:  Whatever is subject to the king is subject to the king’s law.  But as 1 Corinthians 15:24 and 28 says, “the Son will be subject to God and the Father ...... when He has handed over the kingdom to Him.”  Therefore, the Son, who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3:  The eternal law is the plan of divine providence.  But many necessary things, e.g., the endurance of incorporeal substances and of the celestial bodies, are subject to divine providence.  Therefore, even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

But contrary to this:  Things that are necessary are such that it is impossible for them to be otherwise, and so they do not need to be restrained.  By contrast, as is clear from what was said above (q. 92, a. 2), law is imposed on men in order to restrain them from evil.  Therefore, necessary things are not subject to law.

I respond:  As was explained above (a. 1), the eternal law is the plan of divine governance.  Therefore, whatever is subject to divine governance is likewise subject to the eternal law, and whatever is not subject to eternal governance is likewise not subject to the eternal law.
Now the distinction between these two sorts of things can be understood on the basis of what we are familiar with.  For things that can be done by men are subject to human governance, whereas things that belong to man’s nature—e.g., that a man has a soul or hands or feet—are not subject to human governance.  So, then, whatever exists in the things created by God—whether it be contingent or necessary—is subject to the eternal law, whereas whatever pertains to God’s own nature or essence is not subject to the eternal law, but is in reality the eternal law itself.

Reply to objection 1:  We can speak of God’s will in two ways.
First, we can speak of the will itself, and if we are speaking in this way, then since God’s will is His very essence, it is not subject either to divine governance or to the eternal law; instead, it is just the same as the eternal law.
Second, we can speak of the divine will in relation what God wills concerning creatures.  The things He wills concerning creatures are subject to the eternal law insofar as a plan for them exists in God’s wisdom.  It is in relation to these things that God’s will is called reasonable.  On the other, in virtue of its very self, God’s will should instead be called the plan itself.

Reply to objection 2:  The Son of God is not made by God, but is instead naturally generated by Him.  And so He is not subject to divine providence or to the eternal law, but, as is clear from De Vera Religione, is rather Himself the eternal law through a certain appropriation (cf. ST 1, q. 39, a. 7-8).  However, He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in accord with which the Father is also said to be greater than He is.

Reply to objection 3:  We concede the third objection, since it has do with necessary things that are created.

Reply to argument for the contrary:  As the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5, certain necessary things have a cause of their necessity, and so they depend on another for the very fact that it is impossible for them to be otherwise.  And this in itself is a certain kind of efficacious restraint.  For things that are restrained are said to be restrained to the extent that they are unable to act differently from the way in which they are determined to (de eis disponatur).