Is there a single law of nature for everyone?

It seems that it is not the case that there is a single law of nature for everyone:

Objection 1:  Decretals, dist. 1, says, “Natural law (ius naturale) includes what is contained in the Law and what is contained in the Gospel.”  But this is not common to everyone, since as Romans 10:16 says, “Not everyone is obedient to the Gospel.”  Therefore, there is not a single natural law for everyone.

Objection 2:  As Ethics 5 says, “Things that are in accord with the law are called just.”  But the same book says that nothing is just for everyone to such an extent that it is not different for some.  Therefore, it is likewise not the case that the natural law is the same for everyone.

Objection 3:  As was explained above (a. 2-3), the law of nature has to do with what man is inclined to according to his nature.  But different men are naturally inclined toward different things; for instance, some are inclined toward a desire for pleasures, others toward a desire for honors, and others toward other things.  Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single natural law for everyone.

But contrary to this:  In Etymologia Isidore says, “The natural law (ius naturale) is common to all nations.”

I respond:  As was explained above (a. 2-3), those things to which man is naturally inclined belong to the law of nature are—and, among other things, it is proper to man that he be inclined to act in accord with reason.
Now as is clear from Physics 1, it belongs to reason to proceed from what is universal (ex communibus) to what is particular (ad propria).  However, speculative reason and practical reason behave differently on this score.  For since speculative reason deals principally with necessary things, which are such that it is impossible for them to be otherwise, truth is found without exception (absque aliquo defectu) in the particular conclusions in just the way it is found in the universal principles.  By contrast, practical reason deals with contingent things, which include human actions, and so even if there is some sort of necessity in the universal [principles], nonetheless, the further down one descends to particulars, the more there are exceptions.  So, then, in speculative matters there is the same truth for everyone both in the principles and in the conclusions, even though the truth is known to everyone only in the principles, which are called common conceptions (communes conceptiones), and not in the conclusions.  By contrast, in practical matters, there is the same practical truth or correctness for everyone only with respect to the universal principles and not with respect to the particulars.  Further, for those for whom the same thing is correctness in the particulars, it is not equally well known to everyone.
So, then, it is clear that with respect to the universal principles of either speculative reason or practical reason, there is the same truth for everyone and it is equally known to everyone.  And with respect to the particular conclusions of speculative reason, there is the same truth for everyone, but it is not equally known to all—for instance, it is true for everyone that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but this is not known to everyone.
However, with respect to the particular conclusions of practical reason, there is not the same truth or correctness for everyone, and even for those for whom it is the same, it is not equally known.  For instance, it is right and true for everyone that one ought to act in accord with reason; and from this principle it follows as a sort of particular conclusion that what has been entrusted to one for safe‑keeping ought to be returned.  And, to be sure, this is true in most cases.  Yet in a given case it may be injurious and thus irrational to return what has been entrusted to one—for instance, if someone were seeking to harm ones’s country.  This sort of exception happens more frequently the further down one descends to particulars—as, for instance, if someone were to say that entrusted things ought to be returned with certain precautions or in a certain way.  For to the extent that more and more particular conditions are added, the more ways there are in which the [rule] can fail, so that it is not right to return what has been entrusted or not right not to return it.
Therefore, one should claim that with respect to its first universal principles, the law of nature is the same for everyone both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge.  On the other hand, with respect to various particulars [rules], which are like the conclusions of those principles, the law of nature is the same for everyone in most cases both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge, but there can be exceptions in a few cases both (a) with respect to correctness because of particular impediments (just as the generable and corruptible natures are defective in a few cases because of impediments) and also (b) with respect to knowledge, and this because the faculty of reason has been corrupted in some cases by passion or by bad habits or by a bad natural condition.  For instance, as Julius Caesar reports in De Bello Gallico, at one time among the Germans theft was not considered bad, even though it is clearly contrary to the law of nature.

Reply to objection 1:  This passage should not be understood to mean that all the things contained in the Law and the Gospel belong to the law of nature.  For many of things set forth in the Law and the Gospel go beyond nature.  Rather, the passage means that what belongs to the law of nature is found more fully in the Law and the Gospel.
This is why, after Gratian had claimed that the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel, he added immediately afterwards, by way of example, “..... by which everyone is commanded to do to another what he wishes to be done to himself.”

Reply to objection 2:  This passage from the Philosopher should be understood to be talking not about those [rules] that are naturally just as universal principles, but rather about those that are naturally just as certain kinds of conclusions that stem from them.  These conclusions have correctness for the most part and they fail in a few cases.

Reply to objection 3:  Just as reason has dominion over and rules the other powers, so it is necessary for all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers to be ordered in accord with reason.  Hence, it is universally right for everyone that all the inclinations of men should be directed in accord with reason.