Was the Old Law good?
It seems that the Old Law was not
good:
Objection 1: Ezechiel
20:25 says, “I gave them precepts that were not good,
and judgments in which they shall not live.” But
a type of law is called good only because of the goodness
of the precepts it contains. Therefore, the Old
Law was not good.
Objection 2:
As Isidore points out, part of the goodness of a law
consists in its promoting the common welfare (communis
salus). But the Old Law did not bring salvation (non
fuit salutifera .....) and brought death and harm
instead (sed magis mortifera et novica). For in
Romans 7:8‑10 the Apostle says, “Without the Law sin was
dead. And I lived some time without the Law. But when
the commandment came, sin revived, and I died”; and in
Romans 5:20 he says, “The Law entered in that sin might
abound.” Therefore, the Old Law was not good.
Objection 3:
Part of the goodness of a law is that it is possible to
observe it in a way that accords with both nature and
human custom. But the Old Law lacked this characteristic;
for in Acts 15:10 Peter says, “Why are you trying to
impose on the necks of the disciples a yoke that neither
our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Therefore, it
seems that the Old Law was not good.
But contrary to this:
In Romans 7:12 the Apostle says, “And so the law is indeed
holy, and the commandment is holy and just and good.”
I respond:
There is no doubt that the Old Law was good. For
just as a theory is shown to be true by the fact that
it is consonant with right reason, so too a law is shown
to be good by the fact that it is consonant with reason.
But the Old Law was consonant with reason. For
as is clear from the commandment laid down in Exodus
20:15, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods,”
the Old Law curbed sense desire (concupiscentia),
which is opposed to reason. It likewise prohibited
all the sins that are contrary to reason. Hence,
it is clear that it was good. And in Romans 7:22
the Apostle’s reasoning is this: “I am delighted
with the Law of God, according to the inward man’; and,
again, “I consent to the Law, because it is good.”
However, notice that, as Dionysius points out in De
Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, the good admits of different
degrees. For some goods are perfect and some are
imperfect. In the case of things that are ordered
toward an end, perfect goodness consists in a thing’s
being such that it is sufficient per se to induce
the end, whereas an imperfect good is such that it contributes
something toward the acquisition of the end but is not
sufficient to induce the end. For instance, a
perfectly good medicine is one that cures a man, whereas
an imperfect medicine is one that helps a man but is
unable to cure him.
Now note that the end of human law is distinct from
the end of divine law. For the end of human law
is temporal peace within the political community (temporalis
tranquillitas civitatis), and human law achieves
this end by curbing exterior acts that involve evils
capable of disturbing the peaceful state of the political
community. By contrast, the end of divine law
is to lead a man to the end of eternal happiness, and
this end is impeded by any sin whatsoever—and not just
the exterior acts, but the interior acts as well.
And so what suffices for the perfection of human law,
viz., that it prohibit sins and mete out punishments,
does not suffice for the perfection of divine law; rather,
divine law has to make a man totally fit for participation
in eternal happiness. Now this
can be brought about only through the grace of the Holy
Spirit, by which the charity that fulfills the law is
diffused in our hearts. For as Romans 6:23 says,
“The grace of God is eternal life.” But the Old
Law was unable to confer this grace, since this was
reserved to Christ. For as John 1:17 says, “The
law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus
Christ.” Hence, the Old Law is, to be sure, good,
but it is an imperfect good—this according to Hebrews
7:19 (“The Law brought nothing to perfection”).
Reply to objection 1:
The Lord is speaking here about ceremonial precepts, which
are called “not good” because they did not confer the
grace through which men are washed of sin—even though
precepts of this sort did show men to be sinners. That is
why the verse expressly says, “and judgments in which they
shall not live,” i.e., judgments through which they cannot
acquire the life of grace, “and I polluted them in their
own gifts,” i.e., I showed them to be polluted “when,
because of their sins, they offered everything that opened
the womb.”
Reply to objection 2:
The Law is said to have killed not as an efficient
cause but as an occasion—and this because of
its imperfection, viz., insofar as it did not confer the
grace through which men would be able to fulfill what it
commanded or to avoid what it forbade. And so this
occasion was not given, but was instead taken by men.
Hence, in the same place the Apostle says, “For sin,
taking the occasion, seduced me through the commandment,
seduced me, and by it killed me.” It is for this same
reason that he says, “The law entered in that sin might
abound,” where ‘that’ implies succession rather than
causality—viz., insofar as men, taking the occasion from
the Law, sinned more abundantly, both because their sin
was more grave after it had been prohibited by the Law,
and also because concupiscence increased, since we desire
all the more what is forbidden to us.
Reply to objection 3:
The yoke of the Law could not have been obeyed without the
help of grace, which the Law did not give. For Romans
9:16 says, “So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him
who runs”—i.e., to will and to run within God’s
precepts—“but of God who shows mercy.” Hence, Psalm
118:32 says, “I have run the way of Your commandments,
since You enlarged my heart”—i.e., through the gift of
grace and of charity. |