Does the Old Law contain judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain any judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts:

Objection 1:  In Contra Faustum Augustine says that in the Old Law “there are precepts that have to do with living life and precepts that have to do with signifying life.”  But the precepts that have to do with living life are the moral precepts, whereas the precepts that have to do with signifying life are the ceremonial precepts.  Therefore, one should not posit distinct judicial precepts in the law over and beyond these two types of precepts.

Objection 2:  The Gloss on Psalm 118:102 (“I have not turned from your judgments”) says, “That is, I have not turned from what you have set up as a rule for living.”  But a rule for living pertains to the moral precepts.  Therefore, the judicial precepts should not be distinguished from the moral precepts.

Objection 3:  Judgment seems to be an act of justice—this according to Psalm 93:15 (“Until justice is turned into judgment”).  But acts of justice, like acts of the other virtues, have to do with the moral precepts.  Therefore, the moral precepts include the judicial precepts within themselves and so should not be distinguished from them.

But contrary to this:  Deuteronomy 6:1 says, “These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments.”  But ‘precepts’ refers antonomastically to the moral precepts.  Therefore, in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts there are also judicial precepts.

I respond:  As has been explained (a. 2), it is the function of divine law to order men to one another and to God.  Both of these functions belong in a general way to the dictates of the law of nature, which the moral precepts are concerned with, but both must be specified by divine law or human law.  For in speculative matters as well as in practical matters (tam in speculativis quam in activis) the naturally known principles are general.  Therefore, just as the specification of the general precept regarding divine worship is accomplished through the ceremonial precepts, so too the specification of the general precept of justice that must be observed among men is specified through the judicial precepts.
Accordingly, one must posit three types of precepts in the Old Law, viz., (a) the moral precepts, which have to do with the dictates of the law of nature, (b) the ceremonial precepts, which are specifications of divine worship, and ©) the judicial precepts, which are specifications of the justice that is to be observed among men.  Hence, in Romans 7:12, after having claimed that “the law is holy,” the Apostle adds, “The commandment is just and holy and good”—‘just’ with respect to the judicial precepts, ‘holy’ with respect to the ceremonial precepts (for ‘holy’ means what has been dedicated to God), and ‘good’, i.e., ‘noble’ (honestum), with respect to the moral precepts.

Reply to objection 1:  Both the moral precepts and the judicial precepts have to do with directing human life.  And they are both contained under one of disjuncts Augustine posits, viz., under ‘precepts that have to do with living life’.

Reply to objection 2:  ‘Judgment’ signifies the execution of justice, which consists in the application of reason in a determinate way to particular actions.  Hence, the judicial precepts share something in common with the moral precepts, viz., being derived from reason, and something in common with the ceremonial precepts, viz., being specifications of general precepts.  And this is why the judicial and moral precepts are sometimes included together under ‘judgments’, as in Deuteronomy 5:1 (“Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments ..... “), while at other times it is the judicial and ceremonial precepts that are included together under ‘judgments’, as in Leviticus 18:4, “You shall do my judgments, and shall observe my precepts”—where ‘precepts’ refers to the moral precepts and ‘judgments’ refers to the judicial and ceremonial precepts.

Reply to objection 3:  An act of justice, taken in general, has to do with the moral precepts, whereas the specification of that act as a particular has to do with the judicial precepts.